International Relations

Europe should be capable of defending its interests without structural dependence on another major power.

This requires autonomy in:

• defence;
• energy;
• telecommunications;
• digital infrastructure;
• industrial production;
• critical raw materials;
• scientific infrastructure;
• transportation;
• space systems;
• pharmaceuticals;
• strategic supply chains.

Strategic autonomy does not mean isolation.

It means that cooperation should remain a choice rather than a necessity imposed by dependency.

The United States is an important partner, but European and American interests are not automatically identical.

Europe should cooperate with the United States when interests converge and act independently when they diverge.

No alliance should require Europe to abandon its own strategic judgement.

Dependence on the United States for defence, digital infrastructure, communications, intelligence, cloud systems, industrial technology, or other critical capabilities weakens European freedom of action.

Europe should therefore progressively develop the ability to operate without such dependencies.

NATO has historically provided a framework for military cooperation between European countries and North America.

However, Europe should not remain permanently dependent on NATO for its own defence.

The long-term objective should be a European defence capability sufficiently strong and autonomous that Europe could defend itself without relying on the United States.

As this capacity develops, Europe should be able to reconsider its dependence on NATO and, eventually, to operate independently from it.

Such a transition should be gradual and based on the existence of credible European military capabilities rather than on symbolic political declarations.

European countries should retain national armed forces while coordinating them far more deeply at European level.

European defence should include:

• common strategic planning;
• joint military exercises;
• interoperable equipment;
• shared logistics;
• coordinated procurement;
• common communications standards;
• shared intelligence capabilities;
• joint command structures where appropriate;
• coordinated cybersecurity;
• shared strategic transport;
• common industrial programmes.

National democratic institutions should retain control over national armed forces.

European coordination should provide scale and interoperability without eliminating national political responsibility.

Military autonomy requires industrial autonomy.

Europe should retain the capacity to design, manufacture, maintain, and replace its own critical defence systems.

This includes:

• aircraft;
• ships;
• land systems;
• ammunition;
• missiles;
• communications systems;
• satellites;
• cybersecurity systems;
• sensors;
• radar;
• electronics;
• secure computing;
• strategic transport.

Dependence on foreign suppliers can become a political constraint during a crisis.

European defence policy should therefore include a long-term industrial strategy.

A credible autonomous European defence capability will require significant public investment.

Defence expenditure should be evaluated according to strategic need rather than an arbitrary political target.

If Europe wants genuine autonomy, it must finance the capabilities required to achieve it.

This investment should preferably strengthen European industrial, scientific, and technological capacity rather than create new forms of external dependence.

France should maintain an independent nuclear deterrent.

Nuclear weapons remain an exceptional and dangerous instrument, but the strategic independence provided by an autonomous deterrent should not be abandoned while other nuclear powers retain comparable capabilities.

The French nuclear deterrent should remain under French political and democratic control.

European defence cooperation should not require transferring ultimate control of French nuclear weapons to European institutions.

Military intervention abroad should remain exceptional.

The use of force should require a strong and clearly stated justification.

Possible justifications may include:

• direct defence of national or European territory;
• defence of an ally under a clear commitment;
• protection against an imminent major threat;
• prevention of extreme and immediate mass violence;
• a legitimate international mandate.

Military intervention should not become a routine instrument of foreign policy.

The expected political outcome, civilian consequences, duration, legal basis, and exit strategy should all be examined before force is used.

International law should remain a central reference for European foreign policy.

Political or economic convenience should not determine whether international law is considered important.

The same legal principles should be applied to allies, partners, competitors, and adversaries.

Selective application of international law undermines its legitimacy.

Europe should therefore be willing to criticise violations even when they are committed by strategically important partners.

Human rights should remain an important component of foreign policy.

Economic interests should not automatically override fundamental legal and human rights considerations.

Europe should be willing to impose political or economic consequences when serious abuses occur.

This does not mean ending all relations with governments whose political systems differ from European ones.

Diplomacy often requires engagement with difficult partners.

However, economic convenience should not erase legal and ethical standards.

European policy toward Russia should combine firmness, deterrence, diplomacy, and continued communication.

Europe should be capable of defending itself against military threats and responding to violations of international law.

Targeted sanctions can be legitimate where they are connected to specific political objectives.

At the same time, diplomatic channels should remain open.

Geography cannot be changed, and long-term European security will eventually require some form of stable relationship between European countries and Russia.

Dialogue should therefore not be confused with weakness, just as deterrence should not be confused with hostility for its own sake.

Europe should maintain economic, diplomatic, scientific, and cultural relations with China.

At the same time, Europe should reduce strategic dependence where such dependence creates vulnerability.

This is particularly relevant for:

• critical raw materials;
• telecommunications;
• electronics;
• batteries;
• industrial equipment;
• pharmaceuticals;
• digital infrastructure;
• strategic manufacturing.

The objective should not be complete economic separation.

It should be diversification, resilience, and the ability to function even if political relations deteriorate.

No single external country should be capable of disabling an essential European function simply by interrupting exports, services, software access, or technical support.

This principle should apply to:

• energy;
• defence;
• telecommunications;
• computing;
• pharmaceuticals;
• transport;
• finance;
• scientific infrastructure;
• industrial machinery;
• strategic materials.

Europe should identify such dependencies systematically and reduce them before they become crises.

International trade is useful, but it should not override environmental, social, fiscal, or strategic objectives.

Access to the European market should increasingly be associated with meaningful requirements concerning:

• environmental standards;
• labour rights;
• taxation;
• product safety;
• traceability;
• strategic security.

Europe should not impose demanding standards on its own producers while accepting imports produced under conditions that systematically circumvent those same objectives.

Trade policy should support resilience and fair competition rather than reward regulatory arbitrage.

Scientific cooperation should remain as open as possible.

Research benefits from international exchange, shared data, mobility, and collaboration across political boundaries.

Scientists should not automatically be treated as extensions of their governments.

Restrictions should therefore be limited to cases involving legitimate security concerns, sensitive technologies, or serious risks of strategic transfer.

Scientific openness should remain the default.

Europe should maintain strong international development programmes.

Support should focus particularly on:

• healthcare;
• education;
• scientific capacity;
• infrastructure;
• clean water;
• energy;
• agriculture;
• climate adaptation;
• institutional capacity.

Development policy should aim to increase long-term autonomy rather than create permanent dependency.

Where possible, programmes should transfer knowledge and technical capacity in addition to financial resources.

Multilateral institutions should be strengthened.

Problems such as climate change, pandemics, nuclear proliferation, trade, migration, scientific cooperation, and international security cannot be managed effectively by individual states acting alone.

The United Nations and other international institutions remain imperfect, but their weaknesses are arguments for reform rather than abandonment.

Europe should work to strengthen:

• international law;
• multilateral diplomacy;
• peaceful dispute resolution;
• international scientific cooperation;
• arms-control mechanisms;
• humanitarian institutions.

A stronger Europe and stronger international institutions are compatible.

Europe should be capable of acting independently while also supporting rules that reduce the need for unilateral action.

The objective of strategic autonomy is not autarky.

Europe should trade, cooperate, conduct research, exchange culture, and build alliances with countries across the world.

But cooperation is healthiest when no participant can impose its will simply by withdrawing access to an essential technology, resource, market, or security guarantee.

International relationships should therefore be based on mutual interest rather than structural dependence.

A more federal Europe should progressively develop a coherent foreign policy.

European countries frequently share interests that can be defended more effectively together than separately.

A common European strategy should coordinate:

• diplomacy;
• trade;
• sanctions;
• development assistance;
• defence;
• energy security;
• industrial policy;
• scientific cooperation;
• strategic infrastructure.

This coordination should remain democratically controlled by European and national institutions.

Foreign policy should not become the exclusive domain of an unaccountable executive.

Europe should aim to become a sovereign political actor capable of cooperating with everyone and depending critically on no one.

Its foreign policy should combine:

• strategic independence;
• military credibility;
• diplomatic engagement;
• respect for international law;
• human rights;
• scientific openness;
• economic resilience;
• multilateral cooperation.

Strength should not require permanent confrontation.

Independence should not require isolation.

The objective is a Europe capable of choosing its own policies rather than having those choices determined by dependency on another power.